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Abstract
Humans and animals face decision tasks in an uncertain multi-agent environment where an agent’s strategy may change in
time due to the co-adaptation of others strategies. The neuronal substrate and the computational algorithms underlying
such adaptive decision making, however, is largely unknown. We propose a population coding model of spiking neurons
with a policy gradient procedure that successfully acquires optimal strategies for classical game-theoretical tasks. The
suggested population reinforcement learning reproduces data from human behavioral experiments for the blackjack and
the inspector game. It performs optimally according to a pure (deterministic) and mixed (stochastic) Nash equilibrium,
respectively. In contrast, temporal-difference(TD)-learning, covariance-learning, and basic reinforcement learning fail to
perform optimally for the stochastic strategy. Spike-based population reinforcement learning, shown to follow the
stochastic reward gradient, is therefore a viable candidate to explain automated decision learning of a Nash equilibrium in
two-player games.
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Introduction
Neuroeconomics is an interdisciplinary research field that tries
to explain human decision making in neuronal terms. Behavioral
outcomes are construed as results of brain activity and the
neuronal correlates of the quantities relevant for the decision
making process are identified. Humans, as economic agents,
attempt to optimize some reward function by participating in the
production, exchange and maintenance of goods. Reward for the
individuals will depend in general not merely upon their own
actions but also on those of the other players and, furthermore,
these will adapt their own strategies.
Classical models in neuroeconomics are based on temporal
difference (TD) learning [1], an algorithm to maximize the total
expected reward [2] with potential neuronal implementations
[3,4]. It assumes that the environment can be described as a
Markov decision process (MDP), i.e. by a finite number of states
with fixed transition probabilities [5]. Multi-agent games, howev-
er, are not Markovian as the evolution of the environment
typically does not only depend on the current state, but also on the
history and on the adaptation of the other agents. Such games can
be described as partially observable Markov decision processes
(POMDP, [6]) by embedding the sequences and the learning
strategies of the other agents into a large state space. We have
presented a policy gradient method for population reinforcement
learning which, unlike TD-learning, can cope with POMDPs and
can be implemented in neuronal terms [7]. Yet, since a human
learner would need to successfully explore the large state space of
the POMDP, this appears to be an unrealistic scenario for
explaining decision making in a multi-agent environment. A more
realistic learning scenario is that humans transiently conceive the
other players to follow a fixed strategy, and try to find their
optimal counter strategy under this stationarity approximation.
Maximizing one’s own payoff while assuming stationarity in the
opponents strategy is called a fictitious play and conditions are
studied when this play effectively converges to a stationary (Nash)
equilibrium [8].
Here we show that for classical two-player games [9] a
simplified population reinforcement learning approach [7], which
is policy gradient under the stationarity approximation, can
reproduce human data. We consider two games, blackjack [10]
and the inspector game [11], as examples for which the optimal
strategy is either deterministic or stochastic, respectively. Opti-
mality is expressed in terms of the Nash equilibrium, a solution
concept for games involving two or more players. It is reached
when no player has anything to gain by changing its strategy
unilaterally. Each player is making the best decision it can, taking
into account the decisions of the other(s), hence the Nash
equilibrium constitutes an optimum. Our algorithm is consistent
with behavioral experiments for these games [10,11] while
performing optimally according to the Nash equilibrium. We also
show that TD-learning as well as covariance learning fail to find
the stochastic Nash equilibrium for the inspector game.
The current paper follows a long tradition of explaining human
and animal behavior by simple models of reward-based learning,
starting from Thorndike’s law of effect [12] and Pavlovian
conditioning paradigms [13,14] up to more recent theories of
reinforcement learning [1,2,15,16]. Basic reinforcement learning
with simple models of a few free parameters have also been
applied to games. It has been shown for a wide set of two-player
games that these simple algorithms well approximate human
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performance [17].Yet, we show that basic reinforcement learning
does not follow the reward gradient, and in fact it does not fit
human data on the inspector game as well as our gradient rule.
Obviously, playing games involves cognitive reasoning, as for
instance captured by the theory of ‘adaptive control of thought–
rational’ (ACT-R, [18]). Within such a theory, our model
represents a neuronal implementation of a ‘production rule’
which initiates a behavioral pattern in response to sensory and
possibly cognitive input.
Results
Model
The network representing a player consists of a population of
N~100 Spike-Response-Model (SRM) neurons with escape noise
[19], driven by a common presynaptic stimulus encoding the
current state of the game (the player’s hand value in blackjack, and
a fixed stimulus for the inspector game). Each input spike pattern
(X ) is composed of M~80 afferent spike trains generated once by
independent 6Hz Poisson processes with T~500ms duration,
and then repeatedly presented with the same fixed spike timings.
The population neurons integrate the afferent presynaptic input
spike trains and produce an output spike pattern (Y , see Fig. 1).
The decision of an individual postsynaptic neuron is denoted by c,
with c~{1, if the considered neuron does not spike, otherwise
c~1. Behavioral decisions D~+1 are stochastically made based
on the population activity A defined as sum of the individual
decisions c across the N population neurons: if A is small, the
population decision is likely D~{1, and the larger A is, the more
likely is D~1. At the end of a game involving either a single
decision (like in the inspector game) or a sequence of decisions (like
in blackjack), a reward signal R is delivered by an external critic
which either informs about winning or losing (with R~+1 like in
blackjack) or delivers a specific payoff (like in the inspector game).
The synapses feeding the stimulating spike pattern to the
population neurons are updated according to a multi-factor
plasticity rule involving the reward, the behavioral decision, the
single neuron decision and the eligibility trace which depends on
the post- and pre-synaptic activity:
Dw~RewDeccE : ð1Þ
Here, Rew is the reward signal encoding the reward prediction
error [20] (see Eq. 5 in Methods), Dec is the global feedback signal
informing the synapses about the population decision D weighted
by the population activity (Eq. 6 in Methods), and c~+1 is the
neuronal decision (spike/no spike). The eligibility trace E is a
synaptic buffer roughly encoding the covariance between the past
pre- and postsynaptic activity relevant for learning (Eq. 8 in
Methods). Technically, E is the derivative of the log-likelihood of
producing the postsynaptic spike train. The learning rule can be
shown to perform gradient ascent in the expected reward
(Supporting Text S2).
While most of the terms in Eq. 1 may have their standard
biological counterpart [16], there is less experimental evidence for
assigning the decision feedback Dec’ to one specific neuromod-
ulator. Yet, be the population neurons recurrently connected [21]
or not, decision learning based on a population always requires
that a global population signal is fed back to the individual
neurons, as otherwise learning would quickly degrade with
increasing population size [7,22]. By the same performance
reasons it is not possible to replace the other factors ‘RewcE’ in
Eq. 1 by a classical spike-timing dependent plasticity (STDP)
implementation endowed with the multiplicative reward signal
‘Rew’ [23]. In fact, reward-modulated STDP is only able to learn
multiple stimulus-response associations when the reward factor
averages out to zero for each stimulus individually, requiring an
additional reward-prediction network [16].
Our neuronal implementation is as simple as possible to provide
the required computational properties. The lack of feedback
connectivity avoids issues relating to population spike correlations
[24], and the neural mechanisms supporting the readout of the
decision and the population feedback signal are not considered
here. Similarly, the fixed spike trains representing an input pattern
is a biological simplification which does not fundamentally restrict
the suggested approach.
Blackjack
The simplified version of blackjack considered here was played
in 18th century France and is the precursor of the version played
in casinos nowadays. The card decks used consist of 52 cards. Ace
counts eleven, jack, queen and king ten points and the numbers
two to ten according to their written value. The player (gambler)
draws one card after the other, starting with an initial two card
hand, with the object of bringing the hand value (total across
drawn cards) as close as possible to 21, but stopping early enough
so that it does not exceed this number, in which case he
immediately loses. Afterwards the croupier does the same for the
bank. The player wins if its score is higher than that of the croupier
or if the croupier exceeds 21, otherwise the croupier wins. The
winner’s payoff is 1, the loser’s {1. We assume that both player
and croupier base their decision whether to draw another card or
not only on their current hand value. Player and bank follow a
strategy defined by the hand value s1 and s2, respectively, from
which on they stop to draw another card.
The described rules of the game result in the payoff-matrix
(Table 1) comprising the average payoff of the bank as a function
of the strategies s1 and s2 of the player and bank, respectively
(Methods). The gambler loses whatever the bank wins, therefore
the game is an example of a zero sum game. For zero sum games a
Nash equilibrium corresponds to a minimax solution [25]. If the
pay-off matrix has a saddle point (an entry which is the maximum
Author Summary
Socio-economic interactions are captured in a game
theoretic framework by multiple agents acting on a pool
of goods to maximize their own reward. Neuroeconomics
tries to explain the agent’s behavior in neuronal terms.
Classical models in neuroeconomics use temporal-differ-
ence(TD)-learning. This algorithm incrementally updates
values of state-action pairs, and actions are selected
according to a value-based policy. In contrast, policy
gradient methods do not introduce values as intermediate
steps, but directly derive an action selection policy which
maximizes the total expected reward. We consider a
decision making network consisting of a population of
neurons which, upon presentation of a spatio-temporal
spike pattern, encodes binary actions by the population
output spike trains and a subsequent majority vote. The
action selection policy is parametrized by the strengths of
synapses projecting to the population neurons. A gradient
learning rule is derived which modifies these synaptic
strengths and which depends on four factors, the pre- and
postsynaptic activities, the action and the reward. We
show that for classical game-theoretical tasks our decision
making network endowed with the four-factor learning
rule leads to Nash-optimal action selections. It also mimics
human decision learning for these same tasks.
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in its row and the minimum in its column) the corresponding
strategy pair is a minimax solution which represents a pure Nash
equilibrium. In blackjack there is a unique such pair,
(s1~15,s2~16), and hence there is a unique Nash equilibrium
at all. For this optimal strategy pair the gambler stops drawing
another card as soon as he has 15 points or more, while the
croupier stops at 16 or more. The entry represents the lowest loss
for the gambler given the strategy of the bank (minimum in the
column), and the maximal payoff obtainable by the bank given the
strategy of the gambler (maximum in the row). The Nash
equilibrium is asymmetric because in the case of a standoff (equal
final hand values) the croupier always obtains reward 1 and the
player {1. For hand values smaller than 11 it is safe to draw
another card whereas for more than 19 drawing another card
leads to certain loss due to exceeding 21. While we do not model
these trivial actions, we address the learning problem for hand
values between 11 and 19.
pRL and TD-learning converge to a pure Nash
equilibrium. We first simulated two neural networks playing
against each other. Each hand value between 11 and 19 was
represented by a fixed spatio-temporal spike pattern generated by 6 Hz
Poisson processes, with different (but fixed) patterns distinguishing
numbers, gambler and croupier. Since initially no ordering information
is associated to the Poisson spike train encoding of the hand values, the
learning process has yet to assign this information by trial and error.
The drawing probabilities for each hand value learned by the gambler
after 500 and 10000 games, averaged over ten runs, are shown in
Fig. 2A. The colored dashed lines in the plot indicate the decision
boundaries of Nash equilibrium above which no further card is drawn
by the gambler or croupier, respectively. Initially, both players
randomly decide with 50% chance to draw (black dashed line). After
about 500 games both players have learned to not exceed 21 and do
not draw further cards for high hand values, being still undetermined
about what action to take for low hand values. After 10000 games both
have learned successfully to draw another card for low hand values and
tend to play according to the Nash equilibrium.
We next simulated the gambler by a neural net and the croupier
by a computer algorithm which follows right from the beginning a
fixed strategy. The resulting drawing probabilities after 10000
games are shown in Fig. 2B for three different strategies of the
croupier, s2~15, 16 and 17. The gambler learns the perfect
response strategies. The neural net exploits deviations of the
croupier from the Nash equilibrium s2~16 by also deviating and
thus increasing its reward. If the croupier stops earlier at s2~15
the gambler continues until s1~16, trying to exceed the croupier’s
hand value (blue), whereas if the croupier stops later at s2~17 the
gambler stops already at s1~12 (green), taking advantage of the
fact that the croupier likely exceeds 21. For the case s2~16 (red),
the gambler does not learn the optimal strategy as well as for the
two others. This is due to the fact that here the true mean rewards
for the strategies s1~14,16 are close to the one for the optimal
s1~15, cf. Table 1, and cannot be distinguished based on merely
10000 samples. Instead of just looking at the strategy we hence
consider the maximally possible and the actually obtained reward
for the three croupier strategies. Fig. 2C depicts the low pass
filtered reward which approaches the theoretical optimum
indicated by the dashed lines and read out from the corresponding
columns s2~15,16,17 in Table 1. For the non-optimal croupier
strategies (s2~15,17) the maximally possible reward is significantly
higher.
Figure 1. Neuronal architecture implementing the two players. Each player i (~1,2) is represented by a population of decision making
neurons (shown 5 of each) which receive an input spike pattern Xi and generate an output spike pattern Yi . The population decision Di~+1 is
represented by a readout unit, with Di~1 being more likely when more decision making neurons fire at least one output spike. The synaptic weights
wi are adapted as a function of Xi , Yi , Di and the reward signal Ri delivered by a critic.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002691.g001
Decision Learning in Two-Player Games
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Hence, from playing against another network and against the
croupier, we conclude that a neuronal population endowed with the
plasticity rule (1) is able to learn the optimal strategies in blackjack,
determined either by the pure Nash equilibrium, or by the
croupier’s fixed strategy. Replacement of the neural net by a TD-
learner yields similar results for both scenarios (Supporting Text S1).
pRL fits human data on blackjack. Human behavior in
blackjack was studied in [10,26], though with a deck of 32 cards.
The instruction of the subjects about the rules of the game already
induces a prior in the drawing behavior with a preference for
drawing or stopping in the case of low or high hand values,
respectively. Neither pRL nor TD can reproduce this type of
learning by insight. Moreover, the network needs first to learn the
ordering of the stimuli by trial-and-error, and hence much more
learning trials are required for the network. To still allow for a
comparison with the human data, we used the same deck of 32
cards and simulated a neural network with initial weights chosen
in such a way, that the initial strategy mimics the one of human’s
(Fig. 2D). After playing the same number of games as humans did,
the network’s final strategy agrees with the experimental data of
humans, showing the same shift to a slightly less risky drawing
behavior.
Inspector game
The inspector game [27] has beenwidely studied in neuroeconomics
[28]. The economic story surrounding the game is that a lazy employee
prefers not to work. An employer knows this and sometimes ‘inspects’,
but has to pay some cost ‘i’for inspection. The payoffs for employee
and employer are shown in Table 2. The inspector game shows only a
mixed Nash equilibrium in which decisions are taken stochastically
with a fixed probability. At the equilibrium, the players mix pure
strategies, each with the same payoff: had these pure strategies different
payoffs, then it would be better to just follow the pure strategy with the
highest expected payoff.
Table 1. Average bank payoff for our version of blackjack.
s1\s2 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
11 0.2982 0.3164 0.3027 0.2544 0.1689 0.0436 20.1237
12 0.1635 0.2015 0.2076 0.1791 0.1130 0.0066 20.1427
13 0.1052 0.1587 0.1806 0.1679 0.1176 0.0266 20.1077
14 0.0438 0.1134 0.1536 0.1597 0.1282 0.0560 20.0598
15 0.0119 0.0706 0.1289 0.1555 0.1450 0.0940 20.0008
16 0.0143 0.0607 0.1085 0.1557 0.1685 0.1411 0.0702
17 0.0543 0.0893 0.1254 0.1628 0.1989 0.1980 0.1539
18 0.1349 0.1598 0.1854 0.2120 0.2394 0.2651 0.2509
The values show the calculated mean gains of the bank, respectively losses of
the gambler, dependent on the strategy of the gambler (stopping to draw a
card at hand values equal or larger than s1) and the croupier (stopping at s2).
The strategies are described by the hand values from which on the players stop
to draw another card. Formatted typesetting is used to highlight the Nash
equilibrium.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002691.t001
Figure 2. Playing blackjack with pRL converges toward pure Nash equilibrium. (A) Average strategy (+SEM) after 500 (open circles) and
10000 (filled circles) games where the gambler (blue) is a neural net as well as the croupier (black). The dotted vertical lines left of s1~15 and s2~16
show the separation line of drawing/not drawing another card for the optimal Nash strategy pair. (B) Average strategy (+SEM) after 10000 games
for a neural net as gambler playing against a croupier that follows a given strategy s2~15 (blue), 16 (red) or 17 (green). The colored dotted lines left
of s1~12,15,16 show the separation line of drawing/not drawing another card for the optimal strategy given that the croupier stops drawing at
s2~17,16,15 (from left to right). (C) Average reward (+SEM) of the gambler for the scenario described in (B). The colored dotted lines show the
maximal reachable average reward. (D) Average strategy (+SEM) over the last 100 out of a total of 880 games for a neural net (red) or human
(green) as gambler playing against a croupier that follows a given strategy s2~15. The initial weights of the network were chosen such that the
strategy in the first 100 trials (blue) mimics the strategy of humans instructed about the game rules (black).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002691.g002
Decision Learning in Two-Player Games
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 4 September 2012 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e1002691
For each value of the inspection cost i, there is a unique mixed
Nash equilibrium in which the probability with which the
employee is shirking just corresponds to the inspection cost,
p(shirk)~i, and the probability with which the employer is
inspecting is p(inspect)~0:5. In this case, neither player can
improve its expected payoff by only unilaterally changing its
strategy. In fact, using p(shirk)~i, the expected payoff for the
employer is always
SR2T~p(shirk)p(inspect)(1{i)zp(work)p(inspect)
(2{i)zp(work)p(don0t inspect)2
~i p(inspect)(1{i)z(1{i)p(inspect)(2{i)z
(1{i)(1{p(inspect))2~2(1{i),
independently of p(inspect). Likewise, if p(inspect)~0:5, the
expected payoff for the employee is always SR1T~0:5, indepen-
dently of p(shirk).
pRL reproduces inspector game data and Nash
equilibria. We played with our neural network as employee
against the algorithm presented in [11] as employer, and we also
simulated two neural nets playing against each other. Fig. 3A
shows a running average over the last 20 trials of the shirk and
inspection rates for the neuronal net employee (green) and
neuronal net employer (red), overlaid with the corresponding
data for a human employee (black) playing against a human
employer (grey, data from [11]). The inspection cost was held
constant during three blocks of 150 trials and stepped from i~0:5
to 0:9 and finally to 0:3. The averaged shirk rate of the neuronal
net employee is in striking agreement with the one of the human
employee across the whole rate of inspection costs (Fig. 3B). There
is also good agreement with the experimental data for the
employee’s reward (Fig. 3C).
To check whether the good fit of the human data is due to the
gradient property alone or whether the population boost is also
necessary we considered single neurons playing against each other
(by setting the number of neurons in the population to N~1,
without changing the learning rule). In this case our learning rule
becomes equivalent to the policy gradient rule for single escape
rate neurons [29,30]. With only a single neuron learning turns out
to be too slow to match the transient behavior in the human data
(Fig. 3A), even after optimizing the learning rate (data not shown).
We have previously shown that the speeding up learning in a
population of spiking neurons is only possible with an additional
population signal modulating synaptic plasticity [22,31]. We
conclude that population learning is necessary, and that other
spike-based gradient rules which do not exploit a population signal
[15,32,33] will also be too slow.
During the 150 trials across an experimental block, the shirk
rates (but not the inspection rates) tended towards the corre-
sponding value of the Nash equilibrium (diagonal line in Fig. 3B),
and so did the employee’s reward (horizontal line in Fig. 3C),
although without reaching them. In the simulation we extended
the block size to check the asymptotic behavior. We found that for
block sizes of 5000 trials, the average shirk and the inspection rates
closely reached the Nash equilibrium (match of simulation points
with the two lines in Fig. 3D).
Despite the match of the average rates with the mixed Nash
equilibria, the running means oscillate around the corresponding
equilibria (shown in Fig. 3E for inspection cost i~0:7), as
predicted by the theory [34,35]. In the asymmetric case, when our
neuronal employee plays against the (apparently not optimal)
computer algorithm, the oscillation vanish and the employee’s
shirk rate reaches the optimal Nash equilibrium (blue), as expected
for a neuronal network endowed by synaptic modifications
following the reward gradient (Supporting Text S2). When two
reward maximizing networks play against each other, however,
each tries to exploit any deviation of the other from his Nash
equilibrium, pushing him even further away. This leads to
oscillations around the Nash equilibrium where a change in
strategy of one player is oppositely directed to the deviation from
the Nash equilibrium of the other player. In fact, when
superimposing one rate with the negative change of the other
rate, a close match is observed (Fig. 3F).
As we are studying a policy gradient algorithm, one may ask how
robust the described properties are in view of a possibly improper
biological implementation. The eligibility trace E (Eq. 8 in
Methods) depends on the presynaptic spike timing and contains a
positive term that depends itself on the postsynaptic spike timing
and a negative term depending on the postsynaptic potential. Due
to the policy gradient property, the two terms are balanced and the
eligibility trace is zero on average. To check for robustness we
performed simulations where this balance is perturbed. The above
results still qualitatively hold true if the negative term in the
eligibility trace is twice as large, or even if it is neglected completely,
yielding STDP with plasticity for pre-post spike pairing only. The
robustness can be attributed to the factor Rew in the learning rule
(Eq. 1) which averages out to 0 due to the subtraction of the reward
prediction (since Rew~R{R, see Eq. 5 in Methods) and hence
neutralizes any bias in the estimate of E [16].
TD-learning is inconsistent with data and Nash. To
value the match generated by our synaptic plasticity rule with
experimental and theoretical data, we also trained a TD-learner on
the inspector game. Yet, the parameter optimized TD-algorithm
roughly reproduces only the humans average shirk rate (Fig. 3B),
but less well the subjects’ rewards (Fig. 3C). More strikingly, two
opposing TD-learners simulated across the 5000 trial blocks do not
behave according to the Nash equilibrium (Fig. 3D), but adopt a
deterministic strategy within such a block (Fig. 3E). When
simulating even longer, oscillations emerge as well, but without
convergence of the long-term average to the Nash equilibrium.
There are principled reasons why TD-learning must generally fail to
find an optimum solution, and in particular a mixed Nash equilibrium.
First, TD-learning assumes that the underlying process is Markovian,
but for multiplayer games this assumption is in general not satisfied. In
fact, because the policy of the other player may change in time during
learning, the optimal decision probabilities depend on past actions.
Values which are assumed to be a function of the current action only,
may therefore be incorrectly estimated. Second, for a mixed Nash
equilibrium, TD-learning may also fail to correctly map values to
decision probabilities at the steady-state after learning. This is because
each policy imposes some predefined mapping from action values to
decision probabilities, and this adhoc mapping may not reflect the true
relationship between expected payoffs and decision probabilities
defining the Nash equilibrium. For the inspector game with inspection
Table 2. Payoff matrix of the inspector game.
employee\ employer inspect Don’t inspect
work 0.5, 2-i 0.5, 2
shirk 0, 1-i 1, 0
The variables in the left of each cell determine the employee’s payoffs, and the
variables in the right determine the employer’s payoffs for each combination of
player’s responses. ‘i’is the cost of inspection to the employer.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002691.t002
Decision Learning in Two-Player Games
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costs i=0:5, for instance, the softmax policy, which selects action a
with probability pa!exp(bQa), whereQa is the value of action a and
b a parameter (inverse temperature) regulating the amount of
stochasticity in the decision making, does never reflect the Nash
probabilities p(shirk)~i and p(inspect)~0:5, whatever the param-
eter b is (see Supporting Text S1).
In other learning tasks, animals and humans transiently match the
choice probabilities with the average payoffs of the corresponding
actions, pa!Qa (for a discussion of probability matching see [36–
38]). In these cases too, TD-learning with softmax will not be able
to find the solutions neither, unless again all p- and Q-values are
each the same, or alternatively, the choice policy is redefined (to
pa!Qa, see [39]). For other examples where TD-learning fails in
each of the two ways of either learning the values or inferring the
choice probabilities see [7].
Not all covariance-rules lead toNashequilibria. Covariance-
based learning rules change the synaptic strengths w according to the
covariance between reward prediction error and some measure of
neuronal activity N , SDwT!SCov(R{SRT,N)T, see e.g. [37],
where S:T denotes expectation. pRL which follows the stochastic
gradient of the expected reward, SDwT!+SRT, is a special instance
of a covariance rule where the quantityN corresponds to the eligibility
trace E (Eq. 1). Steady-states of covariance rules satisfy Herrnstein’s
matching law [37,40]. This law states that the number of times an action
is chosen is proportional to the reward accumulated from choosing that
action. Formally, na~aR
acc
a , where na is the number of times an
action a is chosen, a is the action-independent proportionality constant,
and Racca is the reward accumulated by action a across its na choices.
Pure strategies, where only a single action is chosen, trivially
satisfy the matching property since for non-chosen actions both na
and Racca vanish. In contrast, stochastic strategies only satisfy
matching in the case that the selected options provide the same
average reward Racca =na (~1=a). The mixed (and trivially the
pure) Nash equilibrium represents a special case of matching. If in
a two-player game, for instance, player 2 adopts a mixed Nash
strategy then, by definition, player 1 receives the same average
reward (1=a) from any action (see also [38]).
Both the steady-state of a covariance rule and the Nash
equilibrium imply matching. But a steady-state of the covariance
rule does not necessarily need to be a Nash equilibrium. This can
be seen by generalizing the classical covariance rule [37] to
population learning, and applying this rule to the inspector game.
To do so we replaced the eligibility trace E in the pRL rule (Eq. 1)
by the deviation of the neuronal response c from its mean, c{c.
Figure 3. pRL but not TD-learning fits data and follows a mixed Nash equilibrium. (A) Choice behavior for pRL versus pRL (employee
green, employer red) and human versus human (employee black, employer gray) [11]. The cost of inspection was stepped from 0:5 to 0:9 to 0:3,
respectively, and this does also correspond to the shirk rate in Nash equilibrium (thick black lines). The inspection rate in the Nash equilibrium would
always be 0:5. (B) Average choice behavior of pRL vs pRL (dark green circles) and TD vs TD (light green circles), pRL for the employee vs computer
algorithm for the employer (blue squares), human vs human (black), human as an employee vs computer algorithm (orange) and monkey vs
computer algorithm (cyan) for 150 trials/block as function of the inspection cost. The solid line indicates the Nash equilibrium. (C) Reward as function
of the inspection cost for 150 trials/block. Coloring as in (B). pRL simulations are more similar to the experimental data than the TD simulations. (D)
Average choice behavior as in (B) but for 5000 trials/block. The inspect rates for pRL vs pRL (TD vs TD) (dark (light) red circles) and pRL vs computer
algorithm (purple squares) are shown too. The lines indicate the Nash equilibrium for the employee (diagonal) and the employer (horizontal). pRL
behaves according to the Nash equilibrium, whereas TD does not. (E) Time course of the probability to shirk with inspection cost i~0:7 for pRL vs
algorithm (blue line) and pRL vs pRL (TD vs TD) (dark (light) green line). For the latter the probability of the employer to inspect is shown too (dark
(light) red line). pRL oscillates around the Nash equilibrium (drawn lines), whereas TD completely deviates from Nash. (F) Time course of the
probability to shirk or inspect respectively with inspection cost i~0:7 for pRL vs pRL (green respectively red, solid) as in E, but shifted up for clarity
and overlaid with the negative change in the shirk rate (green dashed) and the change in the inspect rate (red dashed) to show the counteractive
behavior.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002691.g003
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The emerging population covariance (pCOV) learning rule,
Dw~gDecc (R{R) (c{c)~RewDecc (c{c) , ð2Þ
with positive learning rate g and estimates R (see Eq. 5 in
Methods) and c for SRT and ScT respectively, does not follow the
reward gradient and does not reliably converge to the unique
mixed Nash equilibrium of the inspector game (Fig. 4). To keep
simulation time short we did not use spiking neurons but merely
binary neurons that produce output c~+1 with probability
Pw(c)~
1
1zexp({cwx)
for a given binary input pattern
x[f{1,1g80. This yields an expected neural response
c~
P
c cPw(c)~tanh(wx=2). Notice that RewDecc can be
considered as the personalized reward for the specific neuron in
consideration: if the sign of Dec and c coincide, the population
reward signal Rew elicited in response to the population decision
can be taken as a personal reward signal for that neuron; otherwise
the neuron’s personal reward has reversed sign of Rew.
Personalizing this way the neuronal rewards within the population
solves the spatial credit-assignment problem and boosts learning
[22]. Fig. 4 (A–D) shows the results for the pCOV rule applied to
the inspector game, once with only the employee playing
according to pCOV against an employer playing according to
the algorithm presented in [11], and once for pCOV versus
pCOV. Only in a fraction of the simulated runs is the mixed Nash
equilibrium reached, while in the other runs, a deterministic (non-
Nash) strategy pair emerges.
As check for robustness we performed further simulations
showing that these negative results hold true also for other (non-
gradient) covariance rules. We considered the version where the
mean c is not calculated analytically but determined as a running
average (as done for R), and where the neuronal activity in the
covariance rule is equal to the binary output, N~c, without mean
subtraction (yielding the simple update rule Dw~RewDec).
Moreover, considering only a single neuron and taking its
response c as the behavioral decision did not qualitatively change
the results, demonstrating that the failure is not due to the
population framework (data not shown).
In [41] the author further elaborates on the relationship of
covariance based rules to the Replicator dynamics. The latter is
described by
Lpa
Lt
~gpa(SRD ~aT{SRT), where gw0 is the
effective learning rate and SRD ~aT is the average reward for
choosing action a. The effective learning rate g depends on the
details of the decision making network and is given in Eq.(14) of
[41]. If synaptic changes are driven by the covariance of reward
and neural activity, then according to the average velocity
approximation, learning behavior is described by the differential
equation above, but the effective learning rate g is not guaranteed
to be positive. Indeed, for the binary neurons one gets
g~g
P
i
xi
1zcosh(wx)
, which can be negative due to negative
components xi. Hence, the convergence statements in [41] do not
apply to our decision making network, and there is no
contradiction with the finding that the covariance rule fails to
reproduce the mixed Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, in the
special case of a 0=1 coding of the inputs xi such that the effective
learning rate becomes positive, and the specific covariance rule
Dw~g(R{R)(c{c) with a single postsynaptic neuron (N~1), we
can also fit the human data (for 150 learning trials) and obtain the
oscillations around the Nash equilibrium (for 5000 trials).
Whereas we do not consider the neural mechanisms supporting
the readout of the decision, such a mechanism has been studied in
the context of matching [42]. There, the probability for decision
making is well described by a logistic function, which is also our
choice for P(DDA). For an increasing amount of stochasticity in the
decision making they report an increasing deviation from
matching towards more uniform choice probabilities. For choice
probabilities larger than 1=2 this leads to lower choice probabilities
than predicted by the matching law, a phenomenon called
undermatching. We also varied the amount of stochasticity by
changing the slope of P(DDA) as a function of A. We find that
increasing and decreasing the slope by a factor of two still robustly
leads to matching for the considered inspection costs, but when
decreasing it by a factor of ten we also observe undermatching.
Due to the stochasticity in the decision making the range of choice
probabilities our network can represent is limited. With increasing
the amount of stochasticity the range becomes smaller and
extreme probabilities close to 0 or 1 predicted by the matching law
cannot be represented. Instead, choice probabilities lie closer to
uniform randomness, i.e. undermatching occurs.
pRL fits data and Nash better than basic reinforcement
models. The Replicator equation is widely used in evolutionary
game theory and provides a good phenomenological description of
choice behavior in many repeated-choice experiments. A different
phenomenological description has been suggested in [17]. Starting
from Luce’s basic reinforcement learning (RE1, see also [43]), the
authors adapt this rule to take account of a generalization and
recency effect (RE3, Methods). They show that both the basic and
extended reinforcement learning reproduces the behavior of
humans in many different games. However, we find that these
rules poorly match human behavior for the inspector game. In
fact, for 150 trials/block both models of Erev and Roth fit the
experimental data significantly worse than pRL (Fig. 4 E and F).
After 5000 trials RE3 converged to a pure (non-Nash) strategy,
and for RE1 the inspection rate diverged away from the Nash
equilibrium of 0:5. This non-optimal equilibrium performance is
consistent with the fact that RE1 and RE3 are not gradient
procedures (see Supporting Text S3). Whether pRL fits the
behavioral data of humans also better in the other games Erev and
Roth considered remains to be tested. In any case, the models
have to cope with the fact that humans show a variety of behaviors
in two-player matrix games, although in many settings they
eventually play according to Nash (for a discussion see [44]).
Discussion
We considered a population of spiking neurons which represent
an adaptive agent in a dynamic environment including other
adaptive agents. The agent’s adaptation was implemented as
population reinforcement learning algorithm (pRL) which was
previously shown to perform stochastic gradient ascent in the
reward for partially observable Markov decision processes
(POMDPs) [7]. Here we showed with blackjack and the inspector
game that pRL can also cope with a dynamic multi-agent
environment and that the performance is comparable to human
data in both these games. In fact, when two neuronal populations
play against each other, they learn to behave according to the
optimal (but unstable) Nash equilibrium. By definition, no further
increase in an agent’s expected payoff is possible in the Nash
equilibrium by only changing its own strategy while the
environment remains stationary. In these steady-state conditions
– where the opponent’s strategy is assumed to be stationary – pRL
is proven to maximize the expected reward (Supporting Text S2).
The simulations show that the equilibrium is indeed reached by
two pRL agents playing against each other, with a pure
(deterministic) Nash equilibrium in blackjack and a mixed
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(stochastic) Nash equilibrium in the inspector game. As predicted
by the theory [34,35], the strategies oscillated around the mixed
Nash equilibrium when both players used the same gradient
algorithm based on the others stationarity assumption, i.e. when
one network played against another both using pRL (with a small
learning rate). Averaging over long enough time windows, i.e. long
compared to the oscillation period, yields the Nash equilibrium
values. However, when implementing only the employee by a
gradient pRL network and the employer by a non-gradient
computer algorithm [11], the two players do not play exactly
equally well. In this case no oscillations occurred and both
converged to and stayed at the optimal Nash equilibrium.
For mathematical clarity we presented the spike-based pRL for
an episodic learning scenario. But a biologically plausible
implementation of a fully online scheme is also possible: to avoid
an explicit separation of stimuli in time, the rectangular window
function used to temporally integrate the eligibility trace (Eq. 8 in
Methods) can be replaced by an exponentially decaying window
function to get a low-pass filtered eligibility trace, and concentra-
tions of neuromodulators can be used to encode feedback about
the population decision and the global reward signal (e.g.
acetylcholine or dopamine) [22]. We considered reward delivery
immediately after stimulus presentation, but reward could also be
substantially delayed when considering a further eligibility trace
incorporating the population decision [7]. Moreover, since
learning in general speeds up with population size (up to 1-shot
learning for stimulus-response associations [31]) we expect that the
convergence for pRL towards the Nash equilibrium can be much
faster than in our example where parameters were fit to reproduce
human data.
The mixed Nash equilibrium represents a special case of
Herrnstein’s matching law [40], according to which the number of
times an action is chosen is proportional to the reward
accumulated from choosing that action. This is true both for the
pure and mixed Nash optimum. In the special case that the
current reward only depends on the current action, but not on past
actions, reward maximization always implies matching. (In fact, if
one action would yield a higher (average) payoff per choice, then
this action must be chosen with probability 1 to maximize
expected reward, and matching (na~aR
acc
a ) is trivially satisfied
(since for the non-chosen action na~R
acc
a ~0). If both actions yield
the same payoff Ra per choice (~R
acc
a =na~1=a), then matching is
again trivially satisfied.) In turn, a reward-based learning rule
which only empirically maximizes reward in this case leads to only
an approximated matching [42]. Choice probabilities which
maximize the expected reward are trivially also fixed points of
any learning rule defined by the covariance between reward and
neuronal activity. (In fact, at the reward maximum there is no
change in neuronal activity which, in average, would lead to an
increase (and in the opposite direction to a decrease) of the
expected reward, and hence the covariance between activity and
reward must vanish.) The other direction, again, is not true: a
covariance-based rule does not necessarily lead to reward
maximization or a Nash equilibrium [37,38]. Indeed, our
Figure 4. Covariance learning rules may lead to a mixed Nash equilibrium, but also to deterministic non-Nash strategies. pRL fits
data better than basic reinforcement models. Time course of the probability to shirk (A,C) and inspect (B,D) with inspection cost i~0:7 for
pCOV vs algorithm (A,B) and pCOV vs pCOV (C,D). In each panel the horizontal lines depict the Nash equilibrium, and for 10 simulation runs
inspection and shirk rates are shown (same color in (A,B) and (C,D), respectively, correspond to the same run). Only a small fraction of all runs
converge or oscillate around the Nash equilibrium, while the other runs result in a deterministic strategy pair. The initial distribution of synaptic
weights w was Gauss with mean 0 and standard deviation 0:02. The learning rate was set to g~0:004, but g~2:10{7 did not change the proportion
of runs converging to the pure strategy. (E) Average choice behavior of pRL vs pRL (green), RE1 vs RE1 (blue), RE3 vs RE3 (red) and human vs human
(black) for 150 trials/block as function of the inspection cost. The light red circles show the average choice behavior for RE3 vs RE3 and 5000 trials/
block. Individual runs converged to a pure strategy, hence the shown averages over 200 runs reflect the percentage of runs converging to a pure
shirk strategy. (F) Reward as function of the inspection cost for 150 trials/block. Coloring as in (E). The solid lines indicate the Nash equilibrium.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002691.g004
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simulations of the inspector game with the canonical covariance-
based plasticity rules show that these rules do not necessarily lead
to the mixed Nash equilibrium, but instead can result in
deterministic (non-Nash) strategies. Similarly, basic reinforcement
rules studied in the context of economics and human decision
making [17] are neither compatible with the mixed Nash
equilibrium for the inspector game.
The performance of spike-based pRL is also superior to TD-
learning [2] which is often discussed in the neuro-economical
context [1]. With the parameter values for which TD-learners
came closest to human data (although without matching them as
closely as pRL), the mixed Nash equilibrium in the inspector game
was not reached within the long learning times. Instead, TD-
learner first adopted a deterministic strategy, transiently switched
their behavior, and swapped back to the same deterministic
strategy. We attributed this mismatch to a general failing of TD-
learning in correctly mapping action values to choice probabilities
in probabilistic decision making tasks. TD-learning with the
softmax choice policy, in particular, fails when matching of choice
probabilities with average payoff is required [40].
Different generalizations have been considered to approach the
shortcomings of algorithms in socio-economic games. TD-learning
has been extended to not only assign values to its own decisions,
but to pairs of own and opponent decisions. This enables the
learning of minimax strategies where reward is maximized for the
worst of the opponents actions [45]. While for zero-sum games
minimax may realize a mixed Nash equilibrium, it results in a
deterministic strategy in the inspector game: minimizing the
maximal loss implies for the employee to always work (to prevent
being caught while shirking), and for the employer to always
inspect (to prevent undetected shirking). Another approach is to
separately learn its own and the opponents action values and then
calculate the Nash equilibrium [46], but such explicit calculations
do not seem to be the typical human behavior in socio-economic
interactions. Instead, it is tempting to consider pRL with long
eligibility traces which, as it performs policy gradient in POMDPs
[7], should find cooperative strategies with, on average, higher
than Nash payoffs for all agents. For the inspector game such a co-
operative strategy is that the employer should let the employee
sporadically shirk (say with probability E) without inspection, but
with the common agreement that shirking will not prevail (leading
to average payoffs
1
2
(1zE) and 2(1{E) for the employee and
employer, respectively).
Although under the specific experimental conditions of the
inspector game humans did not show cooperation, they often do so
in other game-theoretic paradigms, as e.g. in the prisoner’s
dilemma, and hence deviate from the Nash equilibrium (for a
review see [47]). It remains a challenge for future modeling work
to capture such cooperative behavior. Likely, this will involve
modeling the prediction of other player’s reactions in response to
ones own actions, as considered in the theory of mind [48] and as
being a hallmark of successful socio-economic behavior.
Given the difficulties of modeling genuine social behavior, and
the difficulties humans effectively have in stacked reflexive
reasoning, the assumption of the opponent’s stationarity consid-
ered here appears as a reasonable approximation for decision
making even in complex situations. In view of its success in
matching behavioral and theoretical data we may ask how far
human decision making is in fact determined by cognitive
reasoning, or whether decisions should rather be attributed to
automated neuronal processes steered e.g. by pRL (which can also
encompass input from a cognitive module as it is suggested for the
production rules in the ACT-R theory, [18]). In fact, daily
experience tells us that decisions are often more appropriate when
we listen to our gut feeling, while we tend to merely add
justifications post-hoc. Or put in Schopenhauer’s words, ‘‘that in
spite of all his resolutions and reflections he does not change his
conduct’’ [49].
Methods
Model details
Focusing on one neuron we denote by X its input, which is a
spike pattern made up ofM spike trains, and by Y its output spike
train. The membrane potential can be written as
u(t)~u0z
XM
i~1
wi
X
s[Xi
E(t{s){
X
s[Y
k(t{s): ð3Þ
The postsynaptic kernel E(t) and the reset kernel k(t) vanish for
tƒ0. For tw0 they are given by
E(t)~
1
tM{tS
e{t=tM{e{t=tS
 
and k(t)~
1
tM
e{t=tM :
For the resting potential we use u0~{1 (arbitrary units). Further,
tM~10ms is used for the membrane time constant and
tS~1:4ms for the synaptic time constant. Action potential
generation is controlled by an instantaneous firing rate w(u) which
increases with the membrane potential. So, at each point t in time,
the neuron fires with probability w(u(t))dt where dt represents an
infinitesimal time window (we use dt~0:2ms in the simulations).
Our firing rate function is
w(u)~kebu,
with k~0:01 and b~5 (parameter values taken from [29], see also
[19]).
We consider a population of N~100 neurons and an input
layer of sizeM~80 for each player that is represented by a neural
net. We assume that each population neuron synapses onto a site
in the input layer with probability of 80%, leading to many shared
input spike trains between the neurons. The population response is
read out by the decision making unit based on a spike/no-spike
code. We introduce the coding function c(Y n), with c(Y n)~{1, if
neuron n does not spike, otherwise c(Y n)~1. The population
activity A being read out by the decision making unit is:
A(Y)~
1ffiffiffiffi
N
p
X
n
c(Y n):
Note that such a formal summation could be implemented in
terms of a neuronal integrator (forming a ‘line attractor’) which
continuously integrates excitatory and inhibitory input and keeps
the neuronal activity at a constant level in the absence of input
[50]. Using this activity readout, the behavioral decision D~+1 is
made probabilistically, with likelihood P(D~1DA) given by the
logistic function
P(D~1DA)~
1
1zexp({A)
, ð4Þ
and P(D~{1DA) being the counter probability. The normaliza-
tion of the activity A with
ffiffiffiffi
N
p
ensures that Var(A)~O(1), thus
being of same order as the noise in the decision readout.
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We now describe the terms, modulating synaptic plasticity in
Eq. (1). The reward feedback Rew encodes the reward prediction
error, as observed in experiments [20],
Rew~g(R{R): ð5Þ
Here R is a running mean estimate of the expected reward,
R/(1{l)RzlR, where we set l~0:1. The parameter g is the
positive learning rate which, for notational convenience, we
absorb into the reward signal. In all pRL simulations we used the
value g~400. Both values l and g (rounded) were chosen to
minimize the Mean Squared Error (MSE) between the average
model and human data (MSE~0:0027 for the shirk rate and
MSE~0:0028 for the employee’s reward in the inspector game).
All other parameter values were taken from [7].
The decision feedback Dec is given by
Dec~
D
1zexp(DA)
, ð6Þ
which is the derivative of logP(DDA), see Eq. (4), with respect to
A; so decision feedback measures how sensitive the decision is to
changes in activity.
As shown in [29], the probability density, Pw(Y ), that a neuron
actually produces the output spike train Y in response to the
stimulus X during a decision period lasting from t~0 to t~T
satisfies:
lnPw(Y )~
X
s[Y
lnw(u(s)){
ðT
0
dtw(u(t)) : ð7Þ
The derivative of lnPw(Y ) with respect to the strength of synapse i
is known as characteristic eligibility in reinforcement learning [51].
For our choice of the firing rate function one obtains for the last
term in (1)
E~
L
Lwi
lnPw(Y )~
ðT
0
dt
X
s[Y
d(t{s){kebu(t)
 !
b
X
s[Xi
E(t{s) :ð8Þ
In all the simulations initial values for the synaptic strength were
picked from a Gaussian distribution with mean zero and standard
deviation equal to 4, independently for each afferent and each
neuron. In the Supporting Text S2 we show that the plasticity rule
(1) composed of the factors (5, 6, 8) and the decision c follows the
stochastic gradient of the expected reward.
TD-learning
For TD-learning we used the SARSA control algorithm [2]
which estimates the values of state-action pairs (s,a). At each point
in time, the value estimates Qa(s) are updated according to
Qa(s)/Qa(s)za R{Qa(s)ð Þ:
Here a is similar to a learning rate and has values between 0 and 1.
R is the reward immediately obtained after performing action a. In
the case of blackjack it is defined as zero if the game is not over
and the player chooses to draw another card, otherwise it is
determined by the payoffs of the considered game. When in state
s, the next action D is chosen using softmax, i.e. according to the
probability P(D~a)!exp(bQa(s)). In all simulations we used the
rounded values a~0:004 and b~50 as they minimized the MSE
between averaged model and human data (MSE~0:0048 for the
shirk rate and MSE~0:0110 for the employee’s reward in the
inspector game). Note that in both TD-learning and pRL we
adapted the same number of free parameters (TD: a and b; pRL: l
and g), making it possible to directly compare the quality of the fit.
Basic reinforcement models
In both Roth-Erev models [17] the probabilistic choice rule is
parametrized using propensities qi. The probability pk that a
specific player (who’s index is omitted) plays his kth pure strategy
is pk~
qkX
l
ql
.
RE1 model. The propensity of the chosen action k is
incremented by the received reward Rk, qi/qizRkdik, where
dik denotes the Kronecker delta. The initial propensities are set to
qi~sX , where X is the average reward for that player under
uniformly distributed pk’s, and the strength parameter s is the one
parameter that is optimized.
RE3 model. In addition to the strength parameter s, the
generalization and forgetting parameters E and w are introduced.
The propensities are updated according to
qi/(1{w)qizRk(1{E)dikzRk E(1{dik) :
The parameters were chosen to minimize the mean squared error
(MSE) between the average model and human data
(MSE~0:0188 (RE1) and 0:0116 (RE3) for the shirk rate and
MSE~0:0081 (RE1) and 0:0060 (RE3) for the employee’s reward
in the inspector game).
Blackjack details
In blackjack we assume an infinite number of card decks.
Independently of the history, the drawing probability therefore
remains constant, with a probability to draw a card with value 10
being
4
13
, and the probability to draw any other value from 2 to 11
being
1
13
. For a strategy determined by the stopping value s we
calculated analytically the probability distribution of hand values
Ps(v) after drawing the last card. The drawing process is iterated
for those hand values that are smaller than s until there is only
probability mass on hand values greater than or equal to s.
Because the lowest card value on the desk remains always 2,
drawing i times in a row yields a lowest possible hand value of 2i.
Hence up to qs=2r cards are drawn in order to obtain a hand
value v greater or equal to s. Let us denote the value of the ith card
by vi and its probability distribution by Q(vi),
Q(vi)~
1
13
for vi[f2,3,:::,9,11g
4
13
for vi~10
0 else:
0
BBBB@
To obtain the probability distribution Ps(v) we sum up the
probabilities of all possible combinations to draw kƒqs=2r cards
that yield hand value v, with the condition that the sum of the first
k{1 drawn cards is smaller than s, such that a kth card is actually
drawn under the stopping strategy.
Decision Learning in Two-Player Games
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 10 September 2012 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e1002691
Ps(v)~
0Pqs=2r
k~1
P11
v1,:::,vk~2
Q(v1)   Q(vk) II
(
for vvs
Pk
i~1 vi~v
 
II
Pk{1
i~1 vivs
 
else
where II is the indicator function which is one if its argument is
true and zero else. The product of the Q(vi) is the joint probability
that the first card has value v1, the second v2 and so on. The first
indicator function ensures that all k drawn cards sum up to v, the
second that k cards are drawn, i.e. the sum of the first k{1 cards
has to be smaller than the stopping value s, because otherwise no
further card would be drawn. For instance in the case of s~15 and
16 one obtains the distributions in Table 3.
Denoting the hand value of the gambler by v1 and that of the
croupier by v2 the payoff of the bank is
R2(v1,v2)~
z1 for v1ƒv2ƒ21 or v1w21
{1 else

Averaging of R2 with respect to the joint distribution
Ps1,s2 (v1,v2)~Ps1 (v1)Ps2 (v2) yields the entry in the average payoff
matrix Table 1 for the strategy pair (s1,s2). For instance for
(s1~15,s2~16), SR2(v1,v2)TP15,16(v1,v2)~
P
v1,v2 P15(v1)P16(v2)
R2(v1,v2)~0:1555.
We defined the drawing probabilities in Fig. 2 for a hand value
at a certain game number g as the frequency with which another
card has been drawn upon the last 20 presentations prior to g of
the corresponding stimulus. The evolution of the average reward
R^g in time in Fig. 2C are the low pass filtered reward sequences,
R^g~(1{l)R^g{1zlRg where Rg is the reward in the g-th game
and l~0:002 was used. The initial value R^0 was calculated
assuming a random 50% choice behavior prior to learning.
The initial weights mimicking the prior strategy of instructed
humans were obtained by training our network to make a decision
with a certain probability. This is possible by adapting pRL to
perform regression (as will be published elsewhere).
Inspector game details
The evolution of the rates in time in Fig. 3E are the low pass
filtered decision sequences, e.g. pt(shirk)~(1{l)pt{1(shirk)
zldt where dt~1 if the employee shirks in trial t, otherwise
dt~0. We used a value of l~0:02 and assumed again an initial
random 50% choice behavior. The rate change in Fig. 3F was
determine by binning the obtained time course of the rate into bins
of width 20, calculating the mean of each bin, and the differences
between succeeding bins. The result was further low pass filtered
once more with an exponential running mean (l~0:1) to reduce
the noise.
Supporting Information
Text S1 We present further results for temporal-difference
learning and elaborate on its failure to learn mixed Nash
equilibria.
(PDF)
Text S2 We show how the plasticity rule presented in the main
text is based on a gradient ascent procedure maximizing the
average reward.
(PDF)
Text S3 We demonstrate that the heuristic rules of Erev and
Roth [17] are no gradient procedures.
(PDF)
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